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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
DoMEsTIc RELATIONS-DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY UPON TERMINA-
TION OF NONMARITAL COHABITATnON-Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d
660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
Plaintiff and defendant began living together in 1964. At that time
they entered into an oral agreement whereby they would combine
their earnings and efforts and would share equally in all property ac-
cumulated while they cohabited. Plaintiff averred that, in addition,
they agreed to hold themselves out to the general public as husband
and wife, although both knew defendant was legally married to an-
other woman. Plaintiff then consented to give up her career as an en-
tertainer in exchange for financial support from defendant for the rest
of her life. For the following seven years, plaintiff rendered full-time
services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook. All
property acquired during this period was taken in defendant's name.
When the parties separated, defendant continued to support plaintiff
for eighteen months, but subsequently refused to provide further sup-
port. Plaintiff brought suit to enforce the oral contracts. The trial
court granted defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and
the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.' The California Supreme
Court reversed and remanded. Held: Express agreements regarding
the distribution of property between nonmarital partners are enforce-
able except to the extent that they expressly and inseparably rest on a
consideration of meretricious sexual services. In the absence of an
express agreement, courts may inquire into the conduct of nonmarital
partners and apply theories of implied-in-fact agreements, resulting or
constructive trusts, quantum meruit, or other equitable remedies in
order to protect the parties' reasonable expectations. Marvin v. Mar-
vin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
In the United States, the number of couples living together without
being married has doubled in the last six years. 2 In apparent response
1. Marvin v. Marvin, No. 44359 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. July 23, 1975), with-
drawn, 50 Cal. App. 3d 84 (1975). The court of appeal opinion is summarized in
I FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2661 (Aug. 12, 1975) and Comment, A Continuing Contro-
versy: Assessing the Still Uncertain Status of the Meretricious Spouse in California,
6 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 179, 194-96 (1975).
2. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION RE-
PORTS, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1976, Series P-20, No.
145
Washington Law Review
to the increasing number of unwed couples and to changing social at-
titudes about marriage and the family, 3 courts have begun to recon-
sider how property acquired during a nonmarital relationship should
be divided and what role the courts should play in such divisions. 4
The California Supreme Court in Marvin v. Marvin reevaluated the
California system of nonmarital property division. In addition to con-
sidering the cause of action for breach of contract raised by the plain-
tiff, the court examined the broad issue of the property rights of non-
marital couples in the absence of an express agreement.
This note will discuss the traditional California rules governing the
division of property acquired during the cohabitation of a man and
woman who are not married, and will evaluate the impact of Marvin
upon established remedies. The rights of nonmarital couples in Cali-
fornia under Marvin will then be compared to the rights of their coun-
terparts in Washington. Finally, suggestions will be offered for the
development in Washington of a doctrine regulating the division of
nonmarital property.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Traditional Policy: The Vallera-Keene Doctrine
A meretricious 5 spouse is one who cohabits with another with the
306, at 4-5 table F (1977). In 1976, approximately 1.3 million persons lived in
660,000 two-person households in which the head of the household shared quarters
with an unrelated adult of the opposite sex. Among individuals who lived alone or
with persons not related to them, however, only nine percent lived in two-person
households. Id. at 5.
3. See generally Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE LJ. 441 (1976);
Foster, Marriage and Divorce in the Twilight Zone, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 462 (1975);
Glendon, Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV.
663 (1976); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974).
4. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently relied on Marvin in ordering the equal
division of real and personal property acquired during a 21-year cohabitation. Carlson
v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977). In Carlson, the parties lived together without
being married (apparently in a meretricious relationship) but held themselves out to
the public as a married couple. The trial court held that the full half share of the
accumulated property awarded to Ms. Carlson was an irrevocable gift from Mr. Olson
in consideration for the wifely and motherly services she performed during the co-
habitation. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the trial court was
justified in utilizing its inherent equitable powers to enforce what "all the facts of this
particular case" indicated were the reasonable expectations of the parties. 256 N.W.2d
at 255. Cf. text accompanying notes 132-37 infra (developments in Washington).
5. The term "meretricious" is defined as "of or relating to a prostitute: having a
harlot's traits." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
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knowledge that the relationship does not constitute a valid marriage. 6
Under the traditional California rule, no community property rights
arose from a meretricious relationship.7 As a result of the rule, the
party holding title to the property accumulated during the period of
cohabitation was awarded that property upon termination of the rela-
tionship.8
The rule for meretricious couples contrasted sharply with judicial
treatment of couples involved in a putative marriage, a relationship in
which at least one of the parties has a good faith belief in the validity
of a void or voidable marriage. Upon the termination of a putative
marriage, accumulated property was in effect divided as community
property would be upon the dissolution of a valid marriage. 9 The pro-
portionate contribution of each "spouse" to the property was immate-
LANGUAGE 1413-14 (1961). Courts appear to have implicitly accepted the literal
definition in denying nonmarital partners, usually women, property rights in jointly
accumulated property. Comment, supra note 1, at 198-200 (1975).
The Marvin court used the terms "nonmarital partner" and "nonmarital relation-
ship" in apparent recognition of the negative connotations of the term "meretricious."
18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The court's usage will be
adopted in this note unless clarity requires the use of the traditional terminology.
6. Comment, Rights of the Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50
CALIF. L. REV. 866, 874 (1962). See also H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESnc RELATIONS 52
(1968).
The test is not whether the parties have the capacity to marry, but rather whether
the parties know they are not validly married. Comment, supra at 874. The cohabita-
tion must last longer than a single night, but the courts have not arrived at a minimum
time period which marks the establishment of a meretricious relationship for purposes
of judicial division of accumulated property. For examples of relationships which
have been held to be meretricious, see Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329,
21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962) (eighteen years); Hill v. Westbrook's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d 458,
213 P.2d 727 (1950) (sixteen years); Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d
761 (1943) (three years).
7. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962);
Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943); Feig v. Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936). Common law marriage
was abolished in California in the nineteenth century. Norman v. Norman, 121 Cal.
620, 628, 54 P. 143, 146 (1898); Estate of Abate v. Kirsch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 282, 292,
333 P.2d 200, 206 (1958).
8. See notes 17-32 and accompanying text infra.
9. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Feig v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 5 Cal. 2d 266, 54 P.2d 3 (1936).
Prior to the enactment of the Family Law Act of 1969, Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch.
1608, § 8, 1969 Cal. Stats. 3314-44 (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West
1970 & Supp. 1977)), California community property law required the equal division
of community property and quasi-community property unless divorce was granted on
the ground of adultery, incurable insanity, or extreme cruelty. In the latter cases prop-
erty was divided in proportions that the court deemed just under all the facts of the
case. Comment, California's Divorce Reform: Its Effect on Community Property
Awards, 1 PAc. LJ. 310 (1970). The 1969 Act provides for equal division subject to
limited exceptions unrelated to the fault of the parties. See note 36 infra.
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rial. 10 The putative relationship alone created property rights because
the putative spouse could reasonably expect to enjoy the continuing
benefits accompanying the status of a valid marriage; equity would
therefore protect his or her interest in jointly accumulated property.
The meretricious spouse, on the other hand, could not reasonably
expect to acquire a continuing interest in property, since he or she
knew that the "illicit" relationship did not constitute a valid mar-
riage.1"
Although meretricious spouses were denied marital or quasi-marital
property rights, they were not precluded from recovering property to
which they were otherwise entitled under alternate theories of contract
and property law. The California Supreme Court laid the foundation
for recovery based on an express contract in Trutalli v. Meraviglia.12
The court found that the parties in Trutalli had entered into two
agreements; one to cohabit and one to jointly hold property. 13 The
court stated:
The fact that the parties . . . at the time they agreed to invest their
earnings in property to be held jointly between them were living to-
gether in an unlawful relation did not disqualify them from entering
into a lawful agreement with each other, so long as such immoral rela-
tion was not made a consideration of their agreement. 14
Later cases continued to enforce express agreements if the considera-
tion for the promise of an ownership interest in property could be dis-
tinguished from the parties' sexual relationship.15 Similarly, the courts
10. Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 P. 441 (1911); Macchi v. La Rocca, 54 Cal.
App. 98, 201 P. 143 (1921).
11. Comment, Illicit Cohabitation: The Impact of the Vallera and Keene Cases
on the Rights of the Meretricious Spouse, 6 U. CAL. D.L. REV. 354, 356-57 (1973).
The differing judicial treatment of putative and meretricious spouses is dramatically
illustrated in Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948).
The court awarded the plaintiff quasi-marital property rights for the period of the
relationship during which she had believed herself to be legally married to the de-
fendant. She was granted no property rights, however, for the period after she dis-
covered the invalidity of the marriage. See Comment, supra note 6, at 866-73.
12. 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932).
13. Id. at700, 12 P.2d at 431.
14. Id. at 701-02, 12 P.2d at 431.
15. Courts enforced express agreements to divide property in the following cases:
Barlow v. Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, 333 P.2d 64 (1958); Croslin v. Scott, 154
Cal. App. 2d 767, 316 P.2d 755 (1957); Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359,
270 P.2d 69 (1954); Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951).
Courts refused to enforce contracts as based expressly on a consideration of sexual
services in two cases. Updeck v. Samuel, 123 Cal. App. 2d 264, 266 P.2d 822 (1954);
Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 213 P.2d 727 (1950).
Under general contract law, a contract may be enforceable although all or part of
Vol. 53: 145, 1977
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indicated that express contracts to compensate for the performance of
services other than sexual services would be enforced. 16
Two cases, Vallera v. Vallera'7 and Keene v. Keene,' 8 established
the doctrinal framework for division based on property law. Three
theories evolved under which spouses without title to the property
accumulated during a nonmarital relationship were allowed recovery:
resulting trust,19 constructive trust,20 and equitable lien.2'
In Vallera v. Vallera, a woman brought an action for separate
maintenance and division of accumulated property after the termina-
tion of a three-year nonmarital relationship. The California Supreme
Court held in a four to three decision that a meretricious spouse does
not acquire by reason of cohabitation alone an interest in property
accumulated during the relaionship.22 The Vallera majority stated in
the consideration is conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy when the
illegal consideration is severable from promises involving legal consideration. RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 606, 607 (1932). A contract in which sexual intercourse is
the consideration is illegal, but cohabitation between parties previous or subsequent
to a contract does not invalidate the contract. Id. § 589; 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §
1476, at 622 (1962). See also Note, Property Rights Between Unmarried Cohabitants,
50 IND. LJ. 389, 391-93 (1975).
16. Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 363, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (1954); Hill
v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 602, 213 P.2d 727, 729 (1950) (dictum).
17. 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
18. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
19. A resulting trust arises from the transfer of property under circumstances
which give rise to an inference that the transferee was not intended to take a bene-
ficial interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 404 (1959). A resulting trust is
designed to carry out the unexpressed intentions of the parties. D. DoBBs, REMEDIES
241 (1973). If a nonmarital partner has contributed all or part of the purchase price
for specific property, and title is in the name of the other spouse, under a resulting
trust theory the partner without title is entitled to a share of the property propor-
tionate to his or her contribution. See Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d
761 (1943); Padilla v. Padilla, 38 Cal. App. 2d 319, 100 P.2d 1093 (1940).
20. In contrast to resulting or "implied-in-fact" trusts, constructive or "implied-in-
law" trusts do not originate from the intent of the parties; rather, they are devices
imposed by courts to prevent unjust enrichment and to force restitution to the plaintiff
of something that in fairness and good conscience does not belong to the defendant.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160, Comment a (1937). The imposition of a con-
structive trust results in an in personam order requiring the defendant to transfer
specific property in some form to the plaintiff. D. DOBBS, supra note 19, at 242; RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). If a nonmarital partner is induced to trans-
fer title to the other partner, and can show either actual fraud, or constructive fraud
plus a confidential relationship between the parties, courts will impose a constructive
trust. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 665 n.5, 371 P.2d 329, 333 n.5, 21 Cal. Rptr.
593, 597 n.5 (1962).
21. If a constructive trust cannot be established, courts may impose an equitable
lien. The property in dispute becomes security for the outstanding debt, but the de-
fendant retains title. See Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 102, 69 P.2d 845,
848 (1937); Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 369, 369-70, 235 P.2d 89, 92
(1951).
22. 21 Cal. 2d at 684-85, 134 P.2d at 762-63. The court in Vallera based its deci-
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dictum that if meretricious spouses agreed to pool earnings and share
equally in jointly accumulated property, equity would protect the in-
terests of each in the property.23 In addition, in the absence of an ex-
press agreement, "the woman would be entitled to share in the prop-
erty jointly accumulated, in the proportion that her funds contributed
toward its acquisition.124 The majority found, however, that the par-
ties in Vallera had not made an express agreement concerning prop-
erty rights, and that the only assets acquired during the relationship
were the man's earnings.25 The woman therefore was denied recov-
ery.26
Nineteen years later, in Keene v. Keene,27 the supreme court nar-
sion on an earlier rule formulated in Flanagan v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 213 Cal. 664,
3 P.2d 307 (1931).
23. 21 Cal. 2d at 685, 134 P.2d at 763.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The Vallera dissent, written by Justice Curtis, argued that permitting the
man "to retain the entire fruits of [the parties'] joint efforts is contrary to the dic-
tates of simple justice." 21 Cal. 2d at 687, 134 P.2d at 764. First, Justice Curtis con-
tended, if express agreements between nonmarital partners are enforceable, it is illog-
ical to refuse to enforce implied-in-fact agreements. Id. at 686, 134 P.2d at 764. The
distinction between express and implied-in-fact contracts relates only to the manifesta-
tion of assent; both are based on the intent of the parties. An express contract is one in
which the terms are stated in words, whereas in an implied-in-fact contract the ex-
istence and terms are manifested by conduct. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1620, 1621 (West
1970). "The true implied contract, then, consists of obligations arising from a mutual
agreement and intent to promise where the agreement and promise have not been
expressed in words." Silva v. Providence Hosp., 14 Cal. 2d 762, 773, 97 P.2d 798,
804 (1939).
Second, Justice Curtis criticized the majority's conclusion that, in the absence of an
express agreement, the nonmarital partner who assumed housekeeping duties, usually
the woman, must show a contribution of "funds" in order to be awarded a one-half in-
terest in jointly accumulated property. This policy was unjust, Justice Curtis argued,
because it implied (a) that a woman's services as cook, housekeeper and homemaker
are valueless, and (b) that in most cases, because the woman in all likelihood would
not hold title to jointly accumulated property, she alone would be punished by the
denial of recovery for participating in a relationship in which both parties were
equally "guilty." Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d at 687, 134 P.2d at 764.
Justice Curtis noted that a putative wife has the same property rights as a validly
married woman because of the application of the community property system to puta-
tive relationships. He continued: "Unless the underlying purpose be to punish the
woman for participating in the illicit relationship-which idea of punishment obviously
has no just place in a controversy between two parties equally guilty-why should not
the same rule be applied to the instant case [a meretricious relationship] ?" Id.
27. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962) (6-1). Court of
appeal decisions after Vallera and before Keene had treated the Vallera majority's
dictum as a rule of law, but generally protected the interests of the partner not holding
title by liberally construing tenuous evidence in order to find express agreements.
Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954); Garcia v. Venegas,
106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App.
2d 188, 185 P.2d 848 (1947); Comment, supra note 1, at 183; Comment, supra note
11, at 359-62.
150
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rowed the basis of recovery for a nonmarital partner without title still
further by interpreting the Vallera majority's use of the word "funds"
to include only money or property of value. The meretricious couple
in Keene lived together for eighteen years. For the first eight years of
the relationship, the woman performed household services, animal
husbandry, and farm labor on a ranch previously acquired by the
man. The woman subsequently assisted the man in the real estate and
furniture business he operated after the ranch was sold.28 The woman
argued that she was entitled, under Vallera, to an interest in the prop-
erty acquired in the man's name during the relationship to the extent
that she rendered services beyond housekeeping. The Keene court
found that she had not proved the elements necessary to establish an
interest in the property under a joint venture, 9 a partnership, 30 or a
resulting31 or constructive32 trust. The court stated that services per-
formed after the purchase of real property do not constitute a contri-
bution giving rise to a resulting trust with respect to such property,
even though the services performed may increase the value of the
property 33
28. 57 Cal. 2d at 659, 371 P.2d at 330, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 594. Justice Peters, dis-
senting, suggested that the majority's statement of the facts underemphasized key
points. Id. at 668, 371 P.2d at 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 600. Peters argued that the
woman's activities went beyond the customary duties of a housewife. From 1938 to
1946, the woman raised a large commercial turkey flock and other poultry flocks,
herded and raised sheep and cattle, cleared land for cultivation, and helped sow and
harvest vegetable, grain, and nut crops. After the sale of the ranch in 1947, the
woman continued to assist the man in his real estate and furniture businesses, al-
though perhaps to a lesser extent. Id. at 668-72, 371 P.2d at 336-37, 21 Cal. Rptr. at
600-01.
29. 57 Cal. 2d at 660,371 P.2d at331, 21 Cal. Rptr. at595. See note 30 infra.
30. 57 Cal. 2d at 660, 371 P.2d at 331, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 595. Essentially the court
found that there was no express agreement between the parties to establish a partner-
ship or joint venture. California law defines a partnership as an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit. CAL. CORP. CODE §
15006(1) (West 1977). In contrast, a joint venture or joint adventure is an under-
taking by two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for profit.
Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 177 P.2d 931 (1947). Knowledge, skill, and
services as well as money constitute valid contributions to a joint venture. Banks v.
Puma, 37 Cal. 2d 838, 236 P.2d 369 (1951). A partnership ordinarily engages in a
continuing business, whereas a joint venture is formed for a single transaction or
series of transactions. Keyes v. Nims, 43 Cal. App. 1, 9, 184 P. 695, 698 (1919).
The incidents of both relationships are substantially similar. See Zeibak v. Nassen,
12 Cal. 2d 1, 12, 82 P.2d 375, 380 (1938).
31. 57 Cal. 2d at 665, 371 P.2d at 333-36, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597-600. See note 19
supra.
32. 57 Cal. 2d at 664 n.5, 371 P.2d at 333 n.5, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 597 n.5.
33. Id. at 665-68, 371 P.2d at 334-36, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 598-600. Justice Peters,
in his dissent, criticized the majority for its narrow interpretation of the term "funds."
General contract and trust law, Justice Peters maintained, recognizes that the contri-
bution of personal services can constitute consideration. Id. at 672-75, 371 P.2d at
151
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With the development of the Vallera-Keene doctrine, the legal
theories available to a nonmarital partner without title arguing for a
share of the property accumulated during the relationship were in-
creasingly restricted. Unless the partner without title could prove an
express agreement, there was ample basis for a court to deny recovery.
This restriction of remedies constituted an implicit refusal to acknowl-
edge that a nonmarital partner without title, usually a woman who
had contributed household services, could reasonably expect to enjoy
an ownership interest in the accumulated property. The courts ap-
peared to view meretricious relationships as contrary to public policy
and consequently undeserving of the protections the legal system af-
fords conventional domestic relationships.
B. The Erosion of Tradition: The Cary Doctrine of Familial Rights
In 1969, the California legislature enacted the Family Law Act,a4 a
statute designed to eliminate the concepts of fault and guilt from mar-
riage dissolutions.35 In addition to creating no-fault divorce, the Act
amended the community property laws to provide that community
338-40, 21 Cal. Rptr, at 602-04. Furthermore, although the woman could not claim
an interest in the ranch itself, she could possibly establish an interest in the fund
created by the sale of the ranch if its value had been increased at least in part by her
efforts. Id. at 672-73, 371 P.2d at 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 603. Justice Peters argued
that it could be inferred from the circumstances that the parties intended the joint
fund to be held by defendant in trust for plaintiff. He stated: "It certainly does no
lasting harm to the law to indulge in the mild presumption that parties intend to deal
fairly with each other and that such presumption will be enforced by presuming the
intent to create a trust." Id. at 674, 371 P.2d at 339, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
Justice Peters concluded that the majority had arbitarily denied the woman recov-
ery according to its own standards of morality. He observed:
Obviously, if the two were not illegally living together, the woman could recover.
In that event it would be a plain business relationship and a contract would be
implied. Illicit cohabitation does not invalidate an otherwise valid relationship.
The man is not entitled to benefit from such nonwifely services simply because
the two have illegally cohabited.
Id. at 672, 371 P.2d at 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
34. Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, 1969 Cal. Stats. 3314-44 (codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & Supp. 1977)).
35. The legislative history of the Act states: "First in priority, then, in any divorce
reform was the elimination of the artificial fault standard. That is the premise of the
Family Law Act. The intent has been to devise practicable procedures and a basis
for dissolution which is descriptive of the actual reasons underlying marital break-
down." 4 CAL. ASSEM. J. 8057 (1969), quoted in Comment, supra note 1, at 187.
For a discussion of the legislative history of the act, see Krom, California's Divorce
Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PAC. L.i. 156 (1970); Comment, The End
of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce Law, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1306 (1970).
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property, with limited exceptions, is to be divided equally upon disso-
lution of marriage without regard to the fault of either spouse.36 The
Act further specifies that the jointly accumulated or quasi-marital
property of a putative marriage is to be divided according to the
community property system if the division of the property is in issue.37
In In re Marriage of Cary,38 a California court of appeal con-
strued the removal of fault determinations in marriage dissolutions as
an indication of a policy determination that concepts of guilt are "no
longer relevant in the determination of family property rights, whether
there be a legal marriage or not."' 39 The court then held that the
community property system of the Family Law Act applied to any
actual family40 relation which included cohabitation and the mutual
36. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1977). There are three exceptions to
equal division. The court may award any asset to one party as necessary to divide
the property on a substantially equal basis where economic circumstances warrant
such a division. Second, the court may offset any sum that has been deliberately
misappropriated from the community by one party from that party's award of prop-
erty. Finally, if the net value of the community is less than five thousand dollars,
the court may award the entire community to the appearing party. CAL. CIV. CODE §
4800(b) (West Supp. 1977).
37. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4452 (West Supp. 1977). The statute defines a putative
spouse as a person who believed in good faith that a void or voidable marriage
was valid. It defines quasi-marital property as the property acquired during the rela-
tionship which would have been community or quasi-community had the marriage
not been invalid. Id. This statutory scheme is in accord with the common law. See
notes 9-10 and accompanying text supra.
38. 34 Cal. App. 2d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973). Paul and Janet Cary lived
together for eight years, and held themselves out as validly married persons, al-
though both knew they were not formally married. They had discussed going through
a ceremony at various times, but never followed through. Their four children listed
"Paul and Janet Cary" as their parents on birth certificates and school forms. Janet
stayed within the home while Paul was employed outside the home. The case is dis-
cussed in Note, In Re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 1226 (1974); Comment, In re Marriage of Carey: The End of the
Putative-Meretricious Spouse Distinction in California, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 436
(1975); 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 186 (1974).
39. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866 (emphasis added). The
court observed that § 4452 does not penalize or reward putative spouses when one
spouse knows of the marriage's infirmity or non-existence and the other does not.
Because a court is not permitted to consider the guilt or innocence of the parties in a
putative relationship, the Cary court reasoned, such a consideration should not be
made in other nonmarital relationships. Otherwise, the court concluded, it would be
obliged to:
[P] resume a legislative intent that a person, who by deceit leads another to be-
lieve a valid marriage exists between them, shall be legally guaranteed half of
the property they acquire even though most, or all, may have resulted from the
earnings of the blameless partner. At the same time we must infer an incon-
sistent legislative intent that two persons who, candidly with each other, enter
upon an unmarried family relationship, shall be denied any judicial aid what-
ever in the assertion of otherwise valid property rights.
Id. at 352, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 865-66.
40. Sociologists have defined a "family" as "a group defined by a sex relationship
153
Washington Law Review
recognition and assumption of the normal rights, duties, and obliga-
tions of marriage, regardless of whether the relationship could be
characterized as marital, putative, or meretricious. 41
The Cary court's broad application of the Family Law Act was
endorsed a year and a half later by a different court of appeal in In re
Estate of Atherley.42 The Atherley court held that meretricious spouses
have the same property rights as putative spouses under the Family
Law Act.43 The court carefully emphasized, however, that it was seek-
ing to protect family property rights, not the rights of all meretricious
spouses. Consequently, only long-term, stable meretricious relation-
ships would come within the community property system.44 Five
months later, in Beckman v. Mayhew, 45 another California court crit-
icized and rejected the Cary-Atherley construction of the Act in favor
sufficiently precise and enduring to provide for the procreation and upbringing of
children." R. MACIVER, SOCIETY: A TEXT BOOK OF SOCIOLOGY 196 (1937), quoted in
Arraros, Concubinage in Latin America, 3 J. FAM. L. 330, 330 n.2 (1963).
Arraros defines concubinage (a nonmarital family relationship) as "a somewhat
durable sexual relationship between two persons of the opposite sex who live under
the same roof and procreate and raise children without undergoing a civil or religious
marriage ceremony." Arraros, supra at 330.
It does not appear, however, that the legal definition of a "family" in the United
States is always dependent on the presence of biological children, or even on the
presence of a sexual relationship. Courts have defined a "family" as a collective body
of persons who form one household under one head and one domestic government,
who have reciprocal natural or moral duties to support and care for one another.
Owens v. Altsheller & Co., 263 Ky. 727, 731-32, 93 S.W.2d 844, 846 (1936); Krug v.
Mills, 159 Md. 670, 152 A. 493, 494 (1930); cf. Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 693 (1976)
(what constitutes a "family" within the meaning of zoning regulations and restrictive
covenants).
41. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 352-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
42. 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1975). When Harold Atherley died
in 1969, two women filed for a determination of heirship as the surviving spouse.
The decedent married Ruth Atherley in 1933, and lived with her until 1947 when he
left her for Annette Atherley. Decedent and Annette lived together, pooling their
resources to acquire property, until decedent's death. In 1961 decedent obtained a
divorce from Ruth in Mexico, and married Annette in Reno, Nevada, in 1962.
43. Id. at 769, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
44. The Atherley court cautioned: "All meretricious relationships, however, do
not automatically trigger this rule." Id. In support of its holding the court cited addi-
tional changes in California statutes which it viewed as implementing a public policy
that sex is an improper basis for discrimination regarding family property rights. The
court reasoned that the Vallera-Keene doctrine discriminated against women by re-
fusing to attribute economic value to household services, and that to continue to
support that doctrine would be inconsistent with the new policy. Id. at 769 n.1 1.
119 Cal. Rptr. at 48 n. 11.
45. 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1975). In Beckman, the parties
lived together for 12 years and did not hold themselves out as married. They did,
however, file joint tax returns and held a joint checking account under the man's
name. The man deposited his earnings in the joint account and the woman performed
housekeeping duties.
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of the traditional rule.46 The Beckman court reasoned that the Family
Law Act explicitly deals only with divisions of property at the termi-
nation of valid and putative marriages, and that the legislature prob-
ably did not intend to change the law dealing with nonmarital rela-
tionships.47 While recognizing that developing social attitudes related
to sexual equality may have made the Vallera-Keene doctrine ana-
chronistic, the Beckman court nonetheless concluded that it was
bound by the earlier decisions of the state supreme court.48
The Cary and Atherley decisions can be viewed as an attempt to
separate moral judgments relating to sexual behavior from judicial
determinations of property ownership. Unfortunately, the courts in
Cary and Atherley were unwilling to characterize the new rule as an
evolution of the common law; both relied instead on an arguably
inaccurate49 analysis of changes in statutory law as authority for
finding a changed public policy. Moreover, even if an alteration of
social mores50 does make abandonment of the traditional rule appro-
priate, it is not clear that the Cary-Atherley doctrine is the most desir-
able solution. The Cary-Atherley doctrine amounts to the restoration
of common law marriage51 in California, with the potential for im-
46. See notes 5-21 and accompanying text supra.
47. 49 Cal. App. 3d at 535, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 607. The Beckman court reasoned
that if the legislature had intended to overrule the Vallera-Keene rule, it would not
have chosen such an "extraordinarily indirect, extremely devious and remarkably
subtle" method. Id. This assessment of legislative intent was apparently shared by the
supreme court in Marvin, which asserted that even if the interpretation of the Cary
court concerning the rights of putative spouses under § 4452 was correct, "it does not
necessarily follow that a nonmarital partner has an identical right." Marvin v. Marvin,
18 Cal. 3d at 680 n.18, 557 P.2d at 120 n.18, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829 n.18.
48. 49 Cal. App. 3d at 535, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 607. The concurring judge in
Beckman, Justice Paras, disagreed with the majority's conclusion that developing
social attitudes may have made the Vallera-Keene rule obsolete, stating that he
could find no change in social attitude which would prefer "informal living arrange-
ments to solemnized marriage, nor any reason ... to suggest one." Id. at 536, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 608.
49. See Comment, supra note 1, at 199-200; Note, supra note 38, at 1232-39.
These commentators observe that the Family Law Act does not, on its face, recognize
any property rights acquired by people in meretricious relationships. One writer notes
that "[i] t is a very long step to imply recognition of community property rights in a
meretricious spouse from the Legislature's express purpose of eliminating guilt and
fault as grounds for dissolution of marriage, awarding of alimony and division of
community property." Comment, supra note 1, at 200.
50. See note 48 supra.
51. The elements of common law marriage are: "(1) an actual and mutual agree-
ment to enter into a matrimonial relationship (2) between parties capable in law of
making such an agreement with (3) cohabitation as husband and wife, or a public
holding out of each other as husband and wife with (4) mutual assumption of mari-
tal duties and oblications [sic]" 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 186, 202 (1974). These elements
are very similar to the elements listed by the Cary court as establishing a relation-
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posing an essentially marital status upon individuals who may have
deliberately elected to forego the legal prescriptions of a state-regu-
lated union.52
II. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Marvin majority reaffirmed the traditional rule allowing re-
covery based on express contracts,5 3 and extended recovery to include
implied-in-fact contracts. 54 The majority then considered the ques-
tion: " 'whether a woman living with a man as his wife but with no
genuine belief that she is legally married to him acquires by reason of
cohabitation alone the rights of a co-tenant in his earnings and accu-
mulations during the period of their relationship.' "5 The court an-
swered in the negative, again reaffirming the traditional rule. The
majority then instituted a policy designed to fulfill the reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship. Noting that
couples choose to forego marriage for various reasons, the majority
directed the lower courts to inquire into the conduct of the parties to
ascertain the applicability of other legal theories-implied-in-fact con-
tract, implied-in-fact partnership or joint venture, constructive or re-
sulting trust, or quantum meruit.56
The Marvin majority reviewed the pre-Cary decisions and con-
cluded that the courts' refusal to permit nonmarital partners to utilize
successfully theories of implied-in-fact contract or equitable remedies
resulted in an unfair distribution of property which was not justified
by the reasons advanced to support the denial of relief. First, the ma-
jority stated, concepts of punishing a "guilty" partner have no place
ship protected by the Family Law Act. The elements listed in Cary include "not only
an ostensible marital relationship but also an actual family relationship, with cohabi-
tation and mutual recognition and assumption of the usual rights, duties, and obliga-
tions attending marriage." In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal.
Rptr. at 867. See Comment, supra note 1, at 186-92.
52. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text infra.
53. 18 Cal. 3d at 667-75, 557 P.2d at 111-16, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 820-25. The
majority specifically found that "no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such
agreements." Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. See notes 12-16
and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the traditional rule.
54. 18 Cal. 3d at 683-84, 557 P.2d at 121-22, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
55. Id. at 676, 557 P.2d at 117, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 826 (quoting Justice Traynor
in Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 684, 134 P.2d 761, 762 (1943)).
56. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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when both parties are equally "guilty.15 7 Second, the argument that
nonmarital partners cannot reasonably expect to have the legal bene-
fits attending a formal marriage ignores the presence of other reason-
able expectations and equitable considerations arising from a nonmar-
ital relationship. 58 Third, there is no more reason to presume that per-
sonal household services are contributed as a gift than to presume that
money or property is contributed as a gift.59 Fourth, the public policy
of protecting the institution of marriage is not served by perpetuating
judicial rules resulting in inequitable property distributions in non-
marital relationships. 60 The Marvin majority concluded: "The mores
of the society have indeed changed so radically in regard to cohabita-
tion that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral consid-
erations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so
many." 61
57. Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. Furthermore, the majority
observed, to the extent that one partner is "punished" by the denial of relief, the
other partner is necessarily rewarded for equally "guilty" conduct by retaining a
disproportionately large share of accumulated property.
58. Id. The majority stated: "We need not treat nonmarital partners as putatively
married persons in order to apply principles of implied conctract, or extend equitable
remedies; we need to treat them only as we do any other unmarried persons."
59. Id. The Marvin majority concurred with Justice Peters' dissent in Keene by
finding that the better approach is to presume that the parties intended to deal fairly
with each other. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 674, 371 P.2d 329, 339, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 593, 603 (1962) (Peters, J., dissenting).
60. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The majority
noted that the Vallera-Keene doctrine discouraged marriage by causing the "income
producing partner to avoid marriage and thus retain the benefit of all of his or her
accumulated earnings." Id.
61. Id. at 683-84, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 83 1. Justice Clark, although
concurring with the majority's approval of plaintiffs alleged contractual remedy,
criticized the majority for creating "economic obligations which may violate legisla-
tive intent, contravene the intention of the parties, and surely generate undue burdens
on our trial courts." Id. at 686, 557 P.2d at 124, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 833. Justice Clark
argued that the majority overreached the facts of the case and created unnecessary
new problems by establishing equitable theories of relief. Id. at 685-86, 557 P.2d at
123-24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33 (Clark, J., dissenting and concurring).
Justice Clark listed several objections to the majority opinion. First, the majority
possibly controverted the legislative intent of the Family Law Act by creating what
Justice Clark viewed as the potential for an equal division rule in nonmarital relation-
ships. Id. at 685, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Second, by ordering the
lower courts to examine the conduct of the parties, the majority opened the way for
the introduction of the legislatively abolished fault system of divorce actions into non-
marital property settlements and placed the lower courts in the position of domestic
arbiters. Id. at 686, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832. Third, Justice Clark ques-
tioned the fairness of imposing economic obligations similar to those of a convention-
al marriage on nonmarital partners when the latter may have foregone marriage in
order to avoid such obligations. Id. Finally, he asserted that allowing recovery in
quantum meruit places nonmarital partners in a better economic position than marital
spouses, while creating the difficulty of quantifying the value of personal domestic
services. Id.
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III. MARVIN'S IMPACT: POTENTIAL THEORIES OF
RECOVERY
In Marvin, the California Supreme Court attempted to eliminate
historical legal barriers so that a nonmarital partner would have "the
same rights to enforce contracts and to assert her equitable interest in
property acquired through her effort as does any other unmarried
person." 62 The decision presents the potential for the development of
a doctrine more responsive to the needs and expectations of nonmar-
ital partners than the traditional policy denying recovery to partners
without title in the absence of an express agreement.
As one commentator has noted, three major doctrines historically
have precluded the application of otherwise standard legal rules to
nonmarital property divisions. 63 First, courts utilized doctrines nor-
mally applicable to arm's length business transactions rather than
those generally applicable to noncommercial domestic settings. 64 Sec-
ond, some courts took the position that cohabitation between the par-
ties to an express or implied-in-fact contract rendered the contract il-
legal and unenforceable. 65 Third, courts refused to attribute economic
value to personal household services. 66 The effect of Marvin on each
of these historical doctrines will be analyzed in the following sections.
A. Nonmarital Relationships: Business or Family?
Nonmarital partners traditionally have existed in the abyss between
the legal treatment of marriage partners and business associates. Both
marital and business relationships are the objects of well-developed
areas of the law, and could serve as models for the regulation of non-
marital relationships. 67 The threshold question implicitly before the
state supreme court in Marvin was whether to treat nonmarital part-
ners as individuals functioning in a setting analogous to a business, or
as individuals enjoying a status analogous to marriage.
In effect, the Cary and Atherley courts resolved this implicit issue
62. Id. at 684 n.24, 557 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
63. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value
of Homemaker's Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 106-07 (1976).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Note, supra note 15, at 399.
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in favor of creating a marriage-like status.68 The Cary-Atherley con-
cept of an "actual family relationship" is functionally indistinguisha-
ble from putative or common law marriages. Each focuses on one
aspect of a relationship between two people-the fact that they are
cohabiting-and then subordinates individual differences by imposing
upon all persons within that class a set of legal incidents based on a
stereotypical relationship.69
The advantage of characterizing a nonmarital relationship as a
legal status is that it formalizes the union and simplifies regulation. It
aids and protects those people who are poor,70 or ignorant of the legal
consequences of cohabitation,7 1 or from cultures which have long
accepted informal family relationships.72 It may also satisfy what
some commentators perceive as social pressure in favor of formalized
sexual ties.73
68. See the discussion of Cary and Atherley at notes 38-44 and accompanying
text supra. "Status" is generally defined as "the condition (as arising out of age, sex,
mental incapacity, crime, alienage, or public station) of a person that determines
the nature of his legal personality, his legal capacities, and the nature of the legal
relations to the state or to other persons into which he may enter." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2230 (1961). "Status"
has been defined by the courts as a legal personal relationship, not temporary in na-
ture nor terminable at the will of the parties, with which third persons and the state
are concerned. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 159 Misc. 830, 290
N.Y.S. 181, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
69. The same analysis has been applied to marriage. Foster, supra note 3, at 463.
70. See Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in
Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 88, 101 (1960).
71. Professor Bruch suggests that most persons do not consider the legal ramifi-
cations of cohabitation. She states:
Most persons, however, are undoubtedly much less sophisticated concerning
financial matters than those who enter express agreements. Indeed, it is much
more likely that they enter their relationship either
1. in ignorance of the legal consequences of either marriage or nonmarriage
(perhaps the majority of non-lawyers believe that common law marriage exists
in all jurisdictions and that protection is granted to stable nonmarital relation-
ships),
2. under the assumption that some legal protections are available, or
3. with absolutely no thought given to the legal consequences of their relation-
ship.
Bruch, supra note 63, at 135. See also Weyrauch, supra note 70, at 101. The-parties
in Cary apparently thought that they had established a common law marriage,
though they knew they were not ceremonially married. Respondent's Reply Brief, In
re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
72. Bruch, supra note 63, at 101. See generally Arraros, supra note 40.
73. Weyrauch, supra note 70, at 108. In addition, one proponent argued that
such an approach is desirable because it would acknowledge
the value of stable personal relationships, the fact that children are born of
such relationships and should be protected, that persons involved in such rela-
tionships make contributions of personal services (particularly women who re-
main at home), and that there is no single, or unchanging, "morality" in need
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The difficulty with a status model, however, is that the incident
package of legal rights and obligations which has been developed may
be totally unsuited to the needs and expectations of the individuals
involved in a nonmarital relationship. The changing roles of women,
advances in birth control methods, and altered attitudes about sex
have made it increasingly unrealistic to presume that the same inten-
tions and expectations attend each extramarital cohabitation. Some
couples may wish to avoid the permanent commitment that marriage
implies, some may cohabit as a prelude to marriage,7 4 and some may
wish to remain single in order to preserve pension or retirement bene-
fits from a previous marriage.75 To impose a marriage-like status on
adults who have consciously chosen to avoid marriage is not only
philosophically objectionable, but may also be constitutionally unac-
ceptable.76
In Marvin, the California Supreme Court chose to treat nonmarital
partners as business associates who happen to be cohabiting, rejecting
the Cary court's status approach. 77 By characterizing nonmarital rela-
tionships as business ventures or economic units, the court left un-
touched the traditional rule that cohabitation alone does not create in
one party any interest in the earnings and property of the other party,
and preserved the flexibility needed to deal equitably with the wide
of the courts' protection.
Comment, supra note 1, at 199.
74. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 675 n.11, 557 P.2d at 117 n.11, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 826 n. 11.
75. Id.; cf. Foster, supra note 3, at 463 (antenuptial contracts for the elderly).
76. The United States Supreme Court has shown some willingness to protect the
sexual privacy of single adults. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(denial of access to contraceptives to unmarried persons violates equal protection
and individual's right to privacy). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (sodomy law upheld).
The plaintiff in Marvin argued that to deny to meretricious couples judicial en-
forcement of contractual rights or rights of status arising from a family relationship
would be a violation of equal protection, due process and rights of privacy, associa-
tion and contract. Petitioner's Supplemental Brief Following Grant of Hearing at
27-34, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
The court did not acknowledge these issues in its opinion, probably because it was
granting judicial relief on other grounds.
77. The Marvin court stated that it was not restoring common law marriage in
California. 18 Cal. 3d at 684 n.24, 556 P.2d at 122 n.24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 n.24.
The court also noted that in a nonmarital relationship, "the parties may expressly or
tacitly determine to order their economic relationship in some other manner, and to
impose community property principles regardless of such understanding may frustrate
the parties' expectations." Id. at 680 n.18, 557 P.2d at 120 n.18, 134 Cal. Rptr. at
829 n.18.
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spectrum of nonmarital relationships.78 Although the court reaffirmed
the traditional rule refusing to treat extramarital cohabitation as
giving rise to a status, it also modified some of the rule's harsher con-
sequences.
B. Contractual Remedies
Under Marvin, express and implied-in-fact agreements between
nonmarital partners are enforceable in the absence of fraud or duress.
It is questionable, however, whether Marvin authorizes the applica-
tion of quasi-contractual or implied-in-law agreements to disputes
between nonmarital partners. Consequently, consensual and noncon-
sensual contractual remedies will be examined separately.
1. Express and implied-in-fact agreements
Two aspects of the court's treatment of contractual remedies are
significant: the court's virtual elimination of the defense of illegality to
express contracts (unless explicitly based on sexual services),79 and its
extension of enforceable contracts to include implied-in-fact agree-
ments.80
Judicial enforcement of consensual agreements is sound policy,81
and is in harmony with the trend toward non-regulation of the sexual
activities of adults.82 In addition, the court's willingness in Marvin to
enforce intentional agreements between nonmarital partners in the
absence of fraud, duress, or overreaching is compatible with the argu-
ments of legal scholars who advocate changing the law governing the
incidents of marriage from one of status to contract.83
78. For a discussion of nonmarital relationships advocating a similar result, see
Note, supra note 15, at 401-02 (1975).
79. 18 Cal. 3d at 668-72, 557 P.2d at 112-15, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821-24.
80. Id. at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
81. California permits married persons to contract as to the ownership of their
own property. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5103 (West 1970). Fairness demands that non-
marital partners be given the same control over their property.
82. Professor Bruch states: "Legislatures have decriminalized nonmarital sex-
ual activity, the Constitutional guarantee of sexual privacy has been extended to
single people, and courts have sustained parental custody rights in the nonmarital
family." Bruch, supra note 63, at 108 (footnotes omitted).
83. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 3, at 463; Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26
U. MIAMI L. REv. 692 (1972); Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to
Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REv. 375 (1974); Weitzman, supra note 3, at 1169. It is
also in harmony with what one commentator views as a shift from state regulation
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Extending the contractual remedies available to nonmarital part-
ners to include implied-in-fact agreements provides a greater chance
of recovery for non-title-holding partners. Past cases have shown that
couples often do not verbalize their expectations and intentions,8 4 and
the courts' traditional refusal to examine the surrounding circum-
stances to determine the formation and terms of an agreement has
usually resulted in one partner retaining all of the accumulated prop-
erty.85
Contractual remedies are attractive because they are flexible
enough to reflect the varied intentions and arrangements8 6 possible in
nonmarital relationships; for example, parties can agree to share
equally in all property, or to share equally only in housekeeping ex-
penses, keeping all other assets and earnings separate. The potential
range of remedies available to nonmarital partners in California under
Marvin appears to be broad. A liberal reading of Marvin would indi-
cate that express or implied-in-fact agreements of coownership, ex-
change, joint venture or partnership, and contracts for services87 are
possible theories for recovery.
The Marvin court sidestepped the issue of maintenance or "ali-
mony" by rejecting the Cary-Atherley status analysis and treating the
plaintiffs allegations of defendant's support obligations as a purely
contractual claim. The issue will undoubtedly arise, however, in fu-
ture cases. Alimony in the marital setting was first conceived of by the
courts as compensation to the wife for loss of the husband's support as
a result of the termination of the marriage. 88 The trend in California
has been to award maintenance for a limited time only,89 reflecting
of the formation, effects, and dissolution of marriage to non-regulation. Glendon,
Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REV. 663, 665-
66 (1976). Glendon argues that nonregulation of marriage has been accompanied
by expanding state involvement with the family-that is, economic and child-related
matters-without regard to whether a ceremonial marriage has taken place. Id.
84. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 26-27, Marvin v. Marvin, No. 44359 (Cal. Ct.
App., 2d Dist. July 23, 1975); text accompanying note 26 supra.
85. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972).
86. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 674 n.10, 557 P.2d at 116 n.10, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 825 n.10.
87. Putative spouses may recover the reasonable value of services rendered with-
out a showing that there was an express contract or that the services were rendered
in expectation of monetary reward. The value of support is subtracted from that
recovery, however. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 100-02, 69 P.2d 845,
848 (1937).
88. Comment, Reduction in Alimony as a Result of Changes in Financial Con-
dition: A Guide for the Practitioner, 15 J. FAM. L. 300, 300 (1977).
89. Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Divorce, 7 FAM. L.Q. 275, 278 (1973).
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the view that divorce should constitute a final and definite termination
of the relationship between the parties, with a minimum of future obli-
gations.9 0 If maintenance awards are allowed at all between nonmar-
ital partners, a similar philosophy should be followed. To be con-
sistent with Marvin, when support is part of a contract between the
parties, the court should enforce the provision unless the result would
be unconscionable.
2. Implied-in-law agreements (quasi-contract)
It is not clear whether the Marvin court restricted contractual re-
covery between nonmarital partners to express and implied-in-fact
agreements, or whether quasi-contractual or implied-in-law agree-
ments are also permissible theories of relief. The court's language is
ambiguous, but it appears more likely that recovery under Marvin is
limited to express and implied-in-fact agreements.
The court summarized its decisions as establishing that "in the ab-
sence of an express agreement, the courts may look to a variety of
other remedies in order to protect the parties' lawful expectations."91
In its discussion of the traditional refusal to allow recovery on "princi-
ples of implied contract or equity,"92 however, the court stated:
But, although parties to a nonmarital relationship obviously cannot
have based any expectations upon the belief that they were married,
other expectations and equitable considerations remain. The parties
may well expect that property will be divided in accord with the par-
ties' own tacit understanding and that in the absence of such under-
standing the courts will fairly apportion property accumulated through
mutual effort.93
90. Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMETrE LJ. 413, 425
(1976).
91. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (emphasis added).
In contrast to implied-in-fact remedies, implied-in-law remedies do not originate
from the intent or acts of the parties; rathei, ItHey are devices imposed by courts to
prevent unjust enrichment and to force restitution to the plaintiff of something that
in fairness and good conscience does not belong to the defendant. See G. BOGERT,
TRusTS 287 (5th ed. 1973); D. DoiAs, supra note 19, at 241.
92. 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
93. Id. (emphasis added). Since the doctrine of quasi-contract or implied-in-law
contracts does not consider the parties' intentions, the doctrine may be applied to
situations in which no agreement exists, an implied-in-fact agreement exists, or where
one party is hostile to any recovery by the other party. Quasi-contractual recovery
results in a money judgment reflecting the court's assessment of the benefits that
have accrued to the defendant through the acts of the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT OF
REST TUTION § 155(1) (1937).
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Although this language can be read as approval of quasi-contrac-
tual recovery94 for nonmarital partners, it is more probable that the
court was hypothesizing rather than decreeing. 95 The court carefully
limited its discussion to implied-in-fact remedies throughout the rest
of the opinion. For example, recovery in quantum meruit, a measure
of the value of services rendered under both implied-in-fact and im-
plied-in-law contracts, 96 is limited to instances in which a nonmarital
partner can show that he or she rendered services with the expectation
of monetary reward. 97 The only implied-in-law remedy included in
the court's list of the specific remedies available is constructive trust
theory, already permissible under the Vallera-Keene doctrine. 98
Even if the court has not sanctioned quasi-contractual recovery in
Marvin, it has not precluded the development of such a doctrine. 99 If
the court does extend theories of recovery to include quasi-contractual
recovery, it should carefully identify the types of criteria that delineate
a relationship deserving of judicial protection. 100 Otherwise, judicial
94. The court uses the term "implied contract" but it is in fact referring to im-
plied-in-fact contracts. See 18 Cal. 3d at 678 n.16, 557 P.2d at 118 n.16, 134 Cal.
Rptr. at 827 n.16.
95. Justice Clark, however, implied that the majority's opinion included noncon-
sensual remedies. He observed: "By judicial overreach, the majority perform a nunc
pro tunc marriage, dissolve it, and distribute its property on terms never contem-
plated by the parties, case law, or the Legislature." 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 P.2d at
124, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 833. It is difficult to ascertain, however, whether Justice Clark
was reacting to the majority's endorsement of implied trusts and the allocations of eco-
nomic value to household services, or whether he was reacting to the possibility of
quasi-contractual recovery. See Respondent's Brief, Marvin v. Marvin, No. 44359
(Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist. July 23, 1975); Petitioner's Supplemental Brief Following
Grant of Hearing, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 600, 557 P.2d 106, 134"Cal. Rptr.
815 (1976).
96. A. CORBIN, supra note 15, § 20, at 51.
97. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 83 1-32. This re-
affirms the traditional rule. See Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 247 P.2d
19 (1952). The majority did nothing pragmatically to increase the frequency or
extent of recovery under the theory. It is doubtful that many couples are know-
ledgeable or sophisticated enough to consider the economic and legal consequences
of not marrying or marrying. To condition recovery upon the showing of intent to
receive economic benefit in an emotionally loaded situation is unrealistic. The appli-
cation of this doctrinal requirement, originally designed to fit business transactions,
seems inappropriate and unduly restrictive in this context.
98. See text accompanying note 20 supra. Putative spouses were traditionally en-
titled to quasi-contractual relief. Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845
(1937).
99. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
100. For instance, would the general doctrinal requirement of one party unjustly
benefiting at another's expense be sufficient for recovery, or would other elements need
to be present? Would the court consider the length of the relationship, the presence of
children, or the extent of the parties' assumption of the duties and obligations usually
associated with marriage?
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intervention under quasi-contractual theory could approach the impo-
sition of a quasi-marital status upon nonmarital partners. 01
C. Economic Value for Personal Services
Under Marvin, personal services can constitute a contribution of
value justifying the imposition of a constructive trust. 02 This reform
is long overdue. Recognizing the fact that household services have
economic value, economists and social scientists have attempted to
estimate the monetary value of those services.' 03 Indeed, the commu-
nity property system has always implicitly recognized the value of
homemaking and child care.'04
In most marital families, the responsibility of homemaking and
child care falls upon one spouse while the other spouse is employed
outside the home; and it is probable that the allocation of duties is
similar in many, if not most, nonmarital households. 105 Consequently,
constructive and resulting trusts may be frequently utilized in future
disputes over real property accumulated during nonmarital relation-
ships. 10 6
When there is no real property involved, recovery in quantum
meruit for the value of services rendered less the value of support pro-
vided may be possible. The California courts traditionally have pre-
cluded recovery by presuming that household services provided by a
nonmarital partner are intended as a gift.' 07 As the Marvin court indi-
cated,' 08 this presumption is illogical and unfair. Furthermore, it is in
101. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text supra.
102. 18 Cal. 3d at 683-84, 557 P.2d at 121-22, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
103. Economists' estimates of the market value of the average American house-
wife's annual services range from $4,705 to $13,364. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND
STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, RESEARCH AND STATISTICS NOTE No. 9,
Economic Value of a Housewife at 1 (1975); Galbraith, A New Economic Role for
Women?, 155 CURRENT 41, 43 (1973). These figures do not reflect the intangible
benefits rendered by a family member at home, such as improvement of assets by
good management, companionship, and social interaction with neighbors which an
employee could not render. Evans, Property Interests Arising from Quasi-Marital
Relations, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 246, 252, 266 (1924).
104. W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 11-11.1
(2d ed. 1971).
105. Bruch, supra note 63, at 112.
106. If record title is held in the name of only one party, coownership is enforce-
able only under trust theory because of the rules of record title. D. DoBBs, supra
note 19, at 240.
107. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 668, 371 P.2d 329, 336, 21 Cal. Rptr.
593, 600 (1962).
108. 18 Cal. 3d at 679, 557 P.2d at 119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
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direct contrast to general contract law, in which it is increasingly pre-
sumed that services must be paid for unless it can be shown that they
were intended as a gift. 109
In his dissent in Marvin, Justice Clark implied that the difficulty of
measuring the value of household services is one factor that should
preclude recovery. 110 Although valuation is a difficult and complex
issue, it is by no means an insurmountable problem. Traditional
quantum meruit doctrine involves measuring the economic value of
services performed;"' nothing logically precludes similar treatment of
household services in nonmarital relationships.
IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO NONMARITAL
PARTNERS IN WASHINGTON
The law in Washington" 2 basically corresponds to the remedies
provided for nonmarital partners under the Vallera-Keene doctrine. 1 3
Cohabitation alone creates no property interests," 4 nor does the
community property system apply to nonmarital relationships." 15
Washington does not follow the doctrines of either common law
marriage 16 or putative marriage.1 7 Instead, Washington law distin-
guishes between meretricious relationships and "innocent relation-
ships," in which either or both of the parties in good faith enters into
an invalid marriage. 1 8 In the latter class of relationships, Washington
109. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 88 (1974). Gilmore states: "We
are fast approaching the point where, to prevent unjust enrichment, any benefit re-
ceived by a defendant must be paid for unless it was clearly meant as a gift." Id.
110. 18 Cal. 3d at 686, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
I1l. See Basset v. Fairchild, 132 Cal. 637, 64 P. 1082 (1901); Meredith v.
Marks, 212 Cal. App. 2d 265, 27 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1963); Bean v. Wilson, 120 Cal.
App. 2d 58, 260 P.2d 134 (1953); Kimes v. Davidson Inv. Co., 101 Cal. App. 382,
281 P. 639 (1929).
112. For general discussions of Washington law, see Cross, The Community
Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729, 736-45 (1974); Comment,
The Meretricious Relationship in Washington: A Survivor's Interest in Common
Property, 9 WILLAMETTE L.J. 102 (1973); 15 J. FAM. L. 350 (1977); 48 WASH L.
REV. 635 (1973).
113. See notes 17-33 and accompanying text supra.
114. In re Estate of Sloan, 50 Wash. 86, 96 P. 684 (1908).
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976). See Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d
345, 351, 196 P.2d 835, 841 (1948).
116. Although common law marriages cannot be instituted in Washington, com-
mon law marriages established in other jurisdictions are recognized. See State ex rel.
Smith v. Superior Court, 23 Wn. 2d 357, 161 P.2d 188 (1945); Stans v. Baitey, 9
Wash. 115, 37 P. 316(1894).
117. Cross, supra note 112, at 736.
118. Id.at737.
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courts will award the innocent party or parties a proportion of the
accumulated property "as would under all the circumstances be just
and equitable." 119
Property acquired in the course of a meretricious relationship, in
the absence of some trust relation, belongs to the party holding legal
title.120 The parties are presumed as a matter of law to have intended
to dispose of jointly accumulated property exactly as they have dis-
posed of it.121 This presumption, known as the "Creasman presump-
tion," can be rebutted by "evidence to the contrary."'21 2 Nonmarital
partners without title have used four legal devices in their attempts to
rebut the Creasman presumption: implied-in-fact partnership or joint
venture, 23 constructive trust, 2 4 resulting trust,12 5 and express or
implied-in-fact contract to make a will.' 26 The parties to a meretri-
cious relationship have the "same right to contract with each other as
domestic strangers,"' 27 but Washington courts will not assume that
parties had an agreement to share property equally in the absence of
proof of a conveyance or contractual relationship. 128
The Creasman presumption has been criticized both by
commentators 29 and by the Washington courts130 as resulting in un-
fair distributions of property, often in opposition to the actual intent
119. Poole v. Schricte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 569, 236 P.2d 1044, 1051 (1951). See
Cross, supra note 112, at 73 8-39.
120. Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wn. 2d 345,96 P.2d 835 (1948).
121. Id. at 356, 96 P.2d at 841. The presumption operates in a particularly harsh
manner in those cases in which a nonmarital relationship ends with the death of one
partner. The combination of the deadman's statute, R.C.W. § 5.60.030 (which pro-
vides that a party in interest cannot testify to transactions or statements made by
the decedent), with the Creasman presumption operates to preclude the recovery ofjointly accumulated property by a non-title holding partner. In re Estate of Thornton,
81 Wn. 2d 72, 79, 499 P.2d 864, 867 (1972); Poole v. Schricte, 39 Wn. 2d 558,
562-63, 263 P.2d 1044, 1048 (1951).
122. Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wn. 2d 627, 630, 305 P.2d 805, 808 (1957).
123. See In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972); Poole
v. Schricte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951).
124. See Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965).
125. See Walberg v. Maltson, 38 Wn. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951).
126. See In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972). To estab-
lish the existence of a contract to make a will, it must be shown (1) that a contract
was entered into between the deceased and the plaintiff; (2) that the services contem-
plated as consideration have been performed; and (3) that the services were performed
in reliance upon the contract. Id. at 76, 499 P.2d at 866.
127. Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wn. 2d 376, 386, 407 P.2d 967, 973 (1965).
128. Id.; see 48 WASH. L. REv. 635, 637 (1973). -
129. Comment, supra note 112, at 113; 48 WASH. L. Rav. 635, 640-42 (1973).
130. Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976); In re Estate of
Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wn. App. 386, 523
P.2d 957 (1974).
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of parties to a nonmarital relationship. Justice Finley deplored the
hypocrisy of the rule:
[T] his court ... in effect, sometimes said, "We will wash our hands
of such disputes. The parties should and must be left to their own de-
vices, just where they find themselves." To me, such pronouncements
seem overly fastidious and a bit fatuous. They. . . ignore the fact that
an unannounced (but nevertheless effective and binding) rule of law is
inherent in any such terminal statements by a court of law.
• . . So, although the courts proclaim that they will have nothing to
do with such matters, the proclamation in itself establishes, as to the
parties involved, an effective and binding rule of law which tends to
operate purely by accident or perhaps by reason of the cunning, antici-
patory designs of just one of the parties. 131
Although the Washington Supreme Court has not yet overruled
Creasman,132 it has indicated its willingness to invalidate its "archaic
presumption," given the proper case. 133 The court has intimated in
dictum that it may establish a common law doctrine of property rights
similar to the Cary-Atherley doctrine under which property rights,
though perhaps not support rights, will be granted upon the termina-
tion of a long-term, stable nonmarital family relationship.13 4 In La-
tham v. Hennessey,135 the court suggested in dictum that it would
consider the duration of the relationship, the purpose of the relation-
ship, and the pooling of resources and services for joint projects. 136
The court stated that if a long-term, stable family relationship exists,
it is reasonable to assume that each member in some way contributed
to the acquisition of the property. A court could then examine the re-
lationship and the property accumulations and make a just and equi-
table disposition of the property. Also, if warranted by the facts of a
particular case, the court could apply the community property laws by
analogy to determine the rights of the parties.137
131. West v. Knowles, 50 Wn. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 692 (1957) (Finley,
J., concurring).
132. The court has, however, restricted Creasman "in its application to its own
particular facts." Id. at 313, 3 11 P.2d at 691.
133. Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn. 2d 550, 555, 554 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1976); In
re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 79, 499 P.2d 864, 867 (1972).
134. In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 79, 499 P.2d 864, 867 (1972).
135. 87 Wn. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976).
136. Id. at 554, 554 P.2d at 1059.
137. Id.
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Like the Cary-Atherley doctrine, this proposed approach comes
close to restoring common law marriage, if it does not in fact restore
it. The negative results of a status model have already been dis-
cussed. 138 A better approach would be to overrule Creasman, and to
refine existing remedies in order to alleviate some of the harsher re-
sults of the current doctrine. If a nonmarital couple enters into an
express agreement regarding property distribution, that agreement
should govern unless it produces unconscionable results. If the facts
and circumstances show that there is an implied-in-fact agreement of
any kind, that agreement should govern property division. In the ab-
sence of an agreement, the courts should use their equity powers to
prevent unjust enrichment in accordance with general common law
doctrines. 139
V. CONCLjSION
In Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court assured non-
marital couples access to judicial relief upon termination of the rela-
tionship. By allowing recovery under a variety of contract and trust
theories and rejecting a status-based analysis, the court ensured that
the judiciary will have the flexibility necessary to deal fairly with the
differing expectations of nonmarital couples. It left many issues unre-
solved, however, including whether nonmarital spouses are entitled to
quasi-contractual relief or maintenance, and what form maintenance
awards will take if allowed. The court has cleared the way in Marvin
for judicial resolution of these issues, but it has not committed itself to
a particular course of action.
The Washington Supreme'Court has indicated that it will adopt a
status-oriented doctrine of nonmarital property division when the
problem next comes before it. Before creating a quasi-marital status
which may contravene the intentions of many nonmarital couples, the
Washington court would do well to examine the California court's
solution in Marvin.
Linda R. Larson
138. See notes 74-76 and accompanying text supra.
139. This result was advocated by amici curiae in Marvin. Brief for Brigitte
Bodenheimer, et al., as Amicae Curiae at 25, Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557
P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
169
